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Non Technical Summary
The law on labour market reforms has severely limited the maximum
benefit period for the elderly; with cuts of up to 14 months, depending
on the age group. Our paper examines this natural experiment and
shows that for the age groups in question, the transition rates from
employment to unemployment rose significantly in the three months
prior to the reform. For the average employee in the age group 57
to 64 years, the monthly probability of transition was approx. 120
percent higher than had been expected without reform. In the post-
reform time period up to 2007, the monthly entry rates of elderly
persons into unemployment fell significantly; among the 57 to 64-year-
olds they were well over 20 percent lower than without the reform. A
considerable share of the low entries in the post-reform time period is
most likely due to the fact that transitions were included as part of
the months before the reform. Since maximum benefit periods have
partly been extended at the beginning of 2008, it was unfortunately
not possible to identify the exact long-term effect of the reform. A
cautious assessment of the effects of the financial reform nevertheless
shows an annual cost-saving potential for unemployment insurance of
3.66 to 4.22 billion euros, compared to the pre-reform period. This
amount corresponds to approx. 13 to 15 percent of the unemployment
benefit expenditures in 2004. The reform thus played a significant role
in subsequent reductions of unemployment insurance contributions.
Das Wichtigste in Kürze
Das Gesetz zu Reformen am Arbeitsmarkt schränkte ab Februar 2006
die Bezugshöchstdauern des Arbeitslosengeldes für Ältere stark ein;
je nach Altersgruppe um bis zu 14 Monate. Wir untersuchen dieses
natürliche Experiment und zeigen: Bei den betroffenen Altersgruppen
stiegen die Übergangsraten aus Beschäftigung in Arbeitslosigkeit in
den drei Monaten vor der Reform deutlich an: Bei einem durchschnitt-
lichen Arbeitnehmer der Altersgruppe 57 bis 64 war die monatliche
Übergangswahrscheinlichkeit sogar um etwa 120 Prozent höher, als
ohne Reform zu erwarten gewesen wäre. Im Nachreform-Zeitraum bis
Ende 2007 sanken die monatlichen Eintrittsraten Älterer in Arbeitslo-
sigkeit deutlich ab; sie lagen bei den 57–64 Jährigen um gut 20 Prozent
niedriger als ohne Reform. Ein beträchtlicher Teil der geringeren Ein-
tritte im Nachreform-Zeitraum dürfte darauf zurückzuführen sein, dass
Übergänge in die Monate vor der Reform vorgezogen wurden. Da der
Gesetzgeber die Bezugshöchstdauern bereits Anfang 2008 teils wieder
verlängerte, lässt sich der exakte langfristige Reformeffekt leider nicht
identifizieren. Dennoch zeigt eine vorsichtige Abschätzung der finanzi-
ellen Reformwirkungen ein Einsparungspotential bei der Arbeitslosen-
versicherung von jährlich 3,66 bis 4,22 Milliarden Euro im Vergleich
zum Vorreform-Zeitraum. Dies entspricht etwa. 13 bis 15 Prozent der
Aufwendungen für Arbeitslosengeld im Jahr 2004. Somit hat diese Re-
form maßgeblich spätere Senkungen der Beitragssätze zur Arbeitslo-
senversicherung ermöglicht.
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1. Introduction
Economic theory suggests that unemployment benefits (UB) reduce incentives to work
(Moffitt and Nicholson, 1982; Mortensen, 1970). The effect of UB on labour market
outcomes might be particularly strong for older individuals, because workers as well
as firms account for expected streams of unemployment benefits when determining the
optimal timing of (early) retirement (Hutchens, 1999; Stock and Wise, 1990). This pa-
per investigates empirically how labour market institutions, in particular the system
of unemployment compensation and its use as a pathway into early retirement, affect
transitions out of employment into unemployment. We analyse the effects of important
legislative changes, which strongly modified the out-of-work options for older individ-
uals: During 2006, Germany has seen a radical shortening of unemployment benefit
entitlement periods for the elderly. Our paper presents first results on the effects of this
highly debated policy change on individual labour market outcomes.
From the 1980s until 2006, the German unemployment benefit system guaranteed
constant and high compensation streams (up to 32 months) for elderly workers. It thus
provided a popular bridge between the exit out of regular employment and the entry
into old age pension. Unemployment incidence was high among older workers with long
tenure, and their labour force participation rate was also exceptionally low (OECD,
2003). In the mid 1990s, unemployment rates for the elderly peaked at about 20–25%
and the situation became more and more financially untenable. Since the second half
of the 1990s, several reforms reduced the generosity of the unemployment compensation
and the pension system, with the aim to postpone workers’ exit out of employment and
their entry into retirement. While changes were rather moderate until the year 2002, the
pace of reforms considerably increased in the period 2003–2006. A key element of these
policy reforms was the reduction in maximum entitlement lengths for unemployment
benefits, which became effective in February 2006.
This paper presents a first empirical analysis of the effects of the 2006 reform on indi-
vidual unemployment incidence. The reform affected only older age groups and can thus
be interpreted as a natural experiment. This allows us to identify the reform effects us-
ing a difference-in-differences approach. We obtain strong evidence that unemployment
incidence considerably declined in response to the reform. Our findings confirm previous
empirical results for earlier policy changes in Germany and Finland (e.g. Fitzenberger
and Wilke, 2010; Kyyrä and Wilke, 2007). Moreover, we find a considerable anticipation
effect just before the reform that led to a peak in the inflow to unemployment during the
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winter 2005/2006. The size of this effect is surprising, as legal regulations were designed
to prevent exactly this anticipation effect. Thus, our results suggest that legislation was
not able to fully absorb economic incentives to exploit the old system as far as possi-
ble. Due to anticipation of the reform and the short period until the next reform took
place in early 2008, our analysis cannot exactly identify the longer-term (steady-state)
reform effect. Nevertheless, our results suggest that the reform was successful by sealing
an important leak in the German unemployment insurance system, as the decrease in
unemployment incidence after the reform clearly offsets the anticipation effect.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives a short review of the theoretical
and empirical literature, while Section 3 describes the institutional setup in more detail.
Section 4 introduces the data and Section 5 presents estimation results. Based on these
estimates, Section 6 provides a fiscal benefit analysis of the reform from the viewpoint
of the Federal Employment Agency. The last section provides a concluding discussion.
2. Theory and Literature Review
Economic theory suggests that less generous unemployment compensation makes the
state of unemployment less attractive. The competitive labour supply model as well
as the basic job search model (Moffitt and Nicholson, 1982, Mortensen, 1970, see also
Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2004, Chap. 1 and 3) show that reservation wages increase with
the generosity of unemployment benefits. As labour market institutions do not operate
in isolation (e.g. Boeri and van Ours, 2008, Chap. 13), we have to take into account
the interplay between the system of unemployment benefits, retirement programs, and
employment protection.
Workers as well as firms optimise their expected present value of future utility or
profit, respectively. A worker will quit once utility from retirement exceeds utility from
remaining employed. In a simple model of the worker’s optimisation decision, it can
be shown that postponing retirement increases income over the remaining life period,
while time to derive utility from being retired decreases; thus that there must be some
optimal retirement age (e.g. Boeri and van Ours, 2008, Chap. 6). Taking into account
uncertainty over future income streams, Stock and Wise (1990) developed an option
value model of the (irreversible) retirement decision, where the retirement decision is
reassessed every period when new information on future earnings arrives. Several recent
papers presented dynamic programming models of the retirement decision and presented
empirical applications (e.g. Hakola and Määtänen, 2009; Karlstrom et al., 2004). In the
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context described by us in more detail in Section 3, achievable consumption and leisure
paths are derived not only from expected future earnings and retirement pensions, but
also from achievable streams of unemployment benefits.
However, firms will often be interested in a separation before a worker’s optimal re-
tirement age (or the mandatory retirement age) has been reached. Boeri and van Ours
(2008, Chap. 6.3.2) discuss the relationship between age and productivity and conclude
that the objective relationship is difficult to establish (results from the literature are
ambiguous); nonetheless, employers seem to have strong opinions about a decreasing
productivity of workers with age. If dismissals are not enforceable due to employment
protection (e.g. Jahn, 2009), or unwarranted due to implicit contracts or fairness con-
siderations (e.g. Gerlach et al., 2008), both parties may negotiate an agreement, often
accompanied by some kind of compensation paid by the firm to the worker. Bentolila
and Bertola (1990) developed a model of a firm’s optimal employment policy in the
presence of hiring and firing costs and showed that a firm reduces its labour force, if
the expected present values of further employment are lower than firing costs. Hutchens
(1999) presented a model where the firm and its workers negotiate a three-period con-
tract over wages, private pensions, and employment probabilities. While the worker is
employed during the first and retired during the third period, his employment proba-
bility during the second period is a function of his productivity at work and at home.
In this context, the availability of second-period social security benefits would raise the
income of second-period retirees and thereby reduce a firm’s costs to reach a mutual
agreement on second period retirement.
There is a broad empirical literature on the effect of changes in the unemployment
compensation system on unemployment duration (e.g. for recent studies Addison and
Portugal, 2008; Lalive et al., 2006; Lalive, 2007, 2008; Lee and Wilke, 2009; Müller et al.,
2007). Fewer studies analyse—as we do—the impact of such changes on unemployment
incidence. Empirical evidence relies predominantly on difference-in-differences estima-
tors (DiD), exploiting reforms in the length of unemployment benefit entitlements that
affected different age groups differently. For Germany, a number of papers have inves-
tigated the reforms of the 1980s and 1990s. Fitzenberger and Wilke (2010) compared
unemployment entries and unemployment duration before and after a UB reform that
took place in the 1980s and extended benefit durations for the elderly unemployed signifi-
cantly. Whereas the reform had only a small effect on unemployment between jobs, it in-
creased entries into permanent non-employment for elderly workers. Müller et al. (2007)
showed that increasing age thresholds for maximum eligibility during 1997 reduced the
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unemployment incidence and in particular early retirement. Hanel (2008) approached
the problem from the viewpoint of an introduction of permanent benefit reductions for
early retirees that was enacted also during 1997. She found that this reduction led to a
postponement of retirement entries by about fifteen months and a delay of employment
exits by about nine months. Empirical evidence for other countries obtained similar re-
sults. For Austria, Winter-Ebmer (2003) analysed the quasi-experimental situation aris-
ing from a large extension of benefit duration in certain Austrian regions. He showed
that unemployment entry rose considerably as a result of the new law. For Finland,
Kyyrä and Wilke (2007) found that increasing the age threshold from which UB could
be utilised as an “unemployment tunnel” into early retirement decreased unemployment
entries of the affected age group.
3. The 2006 Reform of Unemployment Benefits
The German unemployment compensation system consists of two main elements. First,
entitled contributors receive UB (Arbeitslosengeld 1) by the unemployment insurance for
a limited time period; its amount depends on former wages. Second, needy unemployed
job-seekers and their household members are entitled to means-tested and tax-financed
unemployment assistance (Arbeitslosengeld 2, UA) since 2005. Contrary to the period
before 2005, its amount does not depend on former wages. The Federal Employment
Agency (Bundesagentur fuer Arbeit, BA) in Nuremberg is the official government body
that administrates the unemployment insurance according to the Social Security Code
(Sozialgesetzbuch, SGB). In order to qualify for UB, workers or employees need to have
been in regular employment at least 12 months during the past three years until 2005,
and during the past two years since 2006. This generates at least 6 months of UB en-
titlements, while the maximum duration depends on the calendar time period and on
the length of the qualifying employment period. Until the end of 2007, unemployed per-
sons of at least age 58 had the opportunity to withdraw from job search (and registered
unemployment), while still receiving UB (see Appendix A). Even though workers and
firms fund German unemployment insurance, there is no comparable experience rating
system as in the US. Thus, lay-offs do not increase social security contribution rates of
firms.
The maximum entitlement length for UB in Germany was subject to several changes
since the 1980s. While it was 12 months independent of age until the mid 1980s, it was
extended to up to 32 months for those aged at least 54. In 1997, the age threshold for
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extended entitlement lengths was raised by a few years, such that the minimum age for 32
months of entitlement increased to 57. This regime was valid until February 2006, when
entitlement lengths were substantially shortened to a maximum duration of 18 months
(see also Table 1); maximum entitlement lengths for older individuals diminished by up
to 14 months for those aged 52–54 and aged >56. However, the variation in actual UB
entitlement lengths did not necessarily change payment streams for low-income earners
(see Appendix A). The shortening was one of the key elements in the series of the so
called “Hartz-Reforms” of the coalition government by Social Democrats and the Green
Party, which were enacted during the period 2003–2006.
This paper analyses the effects of the aforementioned 2006 UB reform on the un-
employment incidence of entitled older individuals. Because entitlements for younger
individuals were not affected, the policy change involved a natural experiment, with
well defined control and treatment groups. Furthermore, the 2006 reform affected all
individuals who lost their job after the 31st of January 2006, while the stock of UB
claimants was unaffected. Therefore, the design of this policy change set economic in-
centives to advance planned dismissals to an earlier date. As it was unpopular with large
parts of the voting population, the successive government (grand coalition of Christian
Democrats and Social Democrats) withdrew the 2006 reform to a large extent in 2008,
by re-extending the UB entitlement lengths to up to 24 months. This new regime was
applied not only to new entries into unemployment, but also to those unemployed at
that point of time. Our empirical analysis focuses on the 2006 reform; comprehensive
individual data for the period after 2007 are not available yet. Nonetheless, labour mar-
ket outcomes in late 2007 may have been already affected due to anticipation of the 2008
reform.
Two other policy changes were enacted at the beginning of 2006. First, as has been
mentioned above, the qualification period for unemployment benefits has been reduced
for all workers. Second, since 2006, a previously granted tax-free allowance for severance
pay (11,000 Euro) has been abolished. Because we would expect severance payments to
be larger for older workers with longer tenure, this modification has potentially reinforced
the effects of the UB reform. Due to a lack of data on severance payments we are
unfortunately, not able to separate between these two effects. However, the financial
consequences of changes in taxation might be bypassed if non-cash benefits can be offered
instead.
It is well known that the extension in UB entitlement lengths during the 1980s has
led to a sharp increase in the incidence of unemployment for older workers (Fitzenberger
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Table 1: The 2006 reform of maximum entitlement length for UB in Germany.
maximum UB entitlement length in months
age group until 1/2006 2/2006 to 12/2007 reduction
<45 12 12 0
45–46 18 12 6
47–51 22 12 10
52–54 26 12 14
55–56 26 18 8
>56 32 18 14
and Wilke, 2010). Workers of age 57 and older could utilise the long entitlement length
for UB as a bridge between employment and old age pensions. In 1997, this form of
early retirement became more difficult as not only the unemployment insurance system,
but also the pension system underwent several important changes (see Appendix A).
Pension reforms were, however, implemented gradually and over very long transitions
periods. Thus their effects should not interfere—or at least not interfere strongly—with
the effects of the (discontinuous) UB reform analysed by us.
Furthermore, several legal requirements could partly block pathways into early retire-
ment. First, dismissal protection for older workers with long tenure is rather strong (see
Appendix A). In particular, employment relationships of long-tenured workers in large
firms are likely to be sensitive to changes in the unemployment benefit system. Jahn
(2009) points out that it is nearly impossible for larger firms in Germany to dismiss
older workers with long tenure due to social criteria; thus they have to “buy out” older
workers by means of severance pay. Such separations are particularly costly and thus,
large firms would be particularly likely to restrain from early retirement offers after a
reduction in expected streams of unemployment compensation. Second, from the end
of 2003 up to the 2006 reform, firms (except for small firms) had to partly or fully re-
fund UB transfers for dismissed older workers with longer tenure (§147a SGB III); the
underlying idea was to prevent anticipation effects of the reform. There are, however,
important exceptions for firms and workers, which may offer opportunities to bypass the
law. In our empirical analysis, we are also able to check whether the implementation
of this law has been successful in the sense that it fully deterred anticipation effects of
the shortened benefit duration. Third, employees who voluntarily quit their job suffer
a cut-off period without UB receipt that shortens the remaining period of UB receipt.
The length of the period was increased several times since the 1980s and has amounted
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to 12 weeks during the time period under investigation (§144 SGB III).
Based on the design of the 2006 reform and our economic reasoning in Section 2, we
formulate the following three hypotheses, which we will analyse in our empirical analysis:
• The reduction in unemployment incidence for older workers depends on the strength
of the treatment. We therefore expect the largest drop in unemployment entries
for the aged 52–54 and aged >56.
• The reform effect is larger for older employees with long tenure in large firms.
Larger firms cannot easily dismiss older workers with long tenure due to social
criteria and have to buy them out. Therefore, they have to offer higher severance
payments (cash and other benefits) and use unemployment benefits as a subsidy
to reach a mutual agreement.
• There is a sharp increase in unemployment incidence briefly before the reform due
to anticipation behaviour.
4. Data and Descriptive Statistics
For our empirical analysis, we use the Integrated Employment Biographies (IEB) of the
Institute for Employment Research (IAB) which is a merged administrative data set.
These data contain daily spell information about employment periods subject to social
security contributions (excludes self employment and life time civil servants), job seeking
periods, participation in active labour market programmes, and UB/UA claim periods1.
For more details on these data see Oberschachtsiek et al. (2009). Our sample covers
the period 2000 to 2007, whereas employment and benefit claim spells are available
since 1993. Our sample is a 2% random sample of employees born before 1970. For
our empirical analysis, we organise the data in form of a monthly panel of workers.
We restrict our sample to individuals aged 40–64, who (would have) had the maximum
UB entitlement lengths under the pre-reform regime. Because special regulations apply
to seasonal unemployment in the construction sector, we exclude it from the following
analysis.
Age-specific unemployment rates in Germany are heavily driven by changes in the
definition of unemployment due to modifications of the aged 58+ rules in 2003 and in
1 The data do not distinguish between employee- and employer-initiated separations. Additional cal-
culations based on the German Socio-Economic Panel suggest that the share of employee-initiated
separations amounts to less than 10 percent for persons aged 40 and older.
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Figure 1: Age-specific UB recipient rates from January 2003 to December 2007 based on
UB claimants and workforce with maximum entitlements only. Source: IEB,
own results.
0
0,02
0,04
0,06
0,08
0,1
0,12
0,14
0,16
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
month
U
B
 r e
c i
p i
e n
t  r
a t
e
aged 40-44 aged 45-46 aged 47-51 aged 52-54 aged 55-56 aged 57-64
2008 (Appendix A). Therefore, we present age group specific rates of UB claimants with
maximum entitlement lengths (cf. Table 1) as a share of the eligible population instead.
Figure 1 shows that there has been a general increase in UB claimant rates until the
end of 2004; rates were mainly stable during 2005 and decreasing after 2005. These
general developments can be explained by increasingly favourable business conditions in
the latter years. Figure 1 also suggests that the gap between claimant rates for older
and prime age unemployed increased within the less favourable business environment
until 2004, and that it decreased during the boom period (2006–2007). Furthermore,
we observe a particularly strong decline in the UB claimant rates after the reform in
February 2006. Moreover, there are considerable peaks in the UB claimant rates of
aged 57–64 and 52–54, the two most affected groups by the UB reform, in late 2005
and early 2006. As there are none or much smaller increases for other age groups, this
provides first empirical evidence for anticipation behaviour before the reform. While
the disproportional changes in the rates provide some descriptive evidence for a reform
effect, it is difficult to establish a clear link to unemployment incidence as the rates
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are also affected by the stock of unemployed or UB claimants and by unemployment
duration. In our econometric analysis, we focus on changes in unemployment incidence.
Because we analyse a reform of the UB system, we restrict our sample to individuals
who were eligible for UB when becoming unemployed. Thus, in our empirical analysis,
we define a transition to unemployment as a transition from employment subject to
social security contributions to claiming UB (Arbeitslosengeld 1)2. Figure 2 displays the
probability of becoming unemployed by age and year3. The unemployment incidence is
computed for workers who are eligible to the maximum unemployment benefit accord-
ing to Table 1 and became unemployed during the current year. Before the UB reform,
those who were 57 and older at the beginning of their unemployment period were eli-
gible for 32 months, i.e. more than 2.5 years of UB. This induced a higher transition
rate to unemployment, which is indicated by a jump in the graph at the age of 57. The
incidence peaked at an age of 60 and then declined for older persons, as other ways
into early retirement became more attractive. Just before the 2006 reform, unemploy-
ment incidence strongly increased for those aged 57+. After January 2006—when UB
entitlement lengths were reduced by more than 50% for the aged 57+—unemployment
incidence peak at an age of 63.
Figure 3 shows monthly transition rates to unemployment during a certain month
for different age groups. Transitions occur more frequently at the end of the year or
quarter, which leads to peaks in the incidence. This pattern is more apparent for the
oldest age group 57+. Furthermore, there is a much higher peak at the end of 2005 for
the age group 57+ and also—but less prominent—for the other age groups. Similar to
Figure 2, this indicates the presence of an anticipation effect just before the UB reform
from November 2005 until January 2006. Moreover, unemployment incidence for the
oldest age group drops from about 0.005 to slightly above 0.0025 after the UB reform,
2 Due to cut-off periods or temporary drop outs, for example, UB claim spells do not always begin at
the end of the previous employment spell. In these cases, it is not observable from the data whether
there is an immediate transition to unemployment or a temporary inactivity period. As the number
of these cases is rather small in our sample, our empirical results are robust with respect to the
maximum allowed gap. We checked this for gaps of up to six months. Our following empirical results
are obtained by allowing for gaps of up to three months between the end date of an employment spell
and the start date of a subsequent UB claim spell.
3 More specifically, the probability of becoming unemployed in year t for a years old workers is computed
as
1−
12∏
m=1
[
1− pa,`,m
]
,
where pa,`,m is the monthly layoff rate among workers aged a for month m of year `, which is defined
as the ratio of workers with eligibility for the maximum entitlement length becoming unemployed
during month m to otherwise equal workers who were still employed at the end of month m.
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Figure 2: Annual transition rates from employment to unemployment by age and year.
Source: IEB, own results.
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while the decline for the other age groups is much smaller.
As described in Section 3, there are several laws that are supposed to prevent early
retirement at the expense of the unemployment insurance. These include cut-off periods
for unemployed who voluntarily quit their job; since 2003, large firms are obliged to
refund unemployment benefits for dismissed older workers with more than 10 years
of tenure. However, a brief study of the official statistics of the Federal Employment
Agency showed that the numbers of such cases are rather low: In April 2006, the stock of
unemployment benefit recipients of age 55 and older for whom unemployment benefits
had to be refunded by the firm peaked at 5,300 cases (the average stock 2005–2006
amounted to about 430,000 persons). The number of cut-off individuals within the
same age group due to quitting peaked in February 2006 at about 2,300 entries, nearly
doubling the average number of cut-off cases (average monthly entries in unemployment
2005–2006 amounted to about 18,000). While we cannot say anything about the ex-ante
(threat) effects of these regulations, we conclude that they have been applied ex-post
only in comparatively few cases and were not able to entirely eliminate anticipation
behaviour just before the reform.
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Figure 3: Monthly unemployment incidence by time, year and age group. Source: IEB,
own results.
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5. Econometric Analysis
The descriptive analysis has already provided first insights how the UB reform in 2006
affected the unemployment experiences of older employees with long UB entitlement
lengths. In order to obtain an estimate of the reform effect on unemployment incidence,
we employ a difference-in-differences (DiD) design with well defined pre- and post-reform
periods and treatment and control groups. DiD estimators are a standard approach
to evaluate policy changes that affect different groups of individuals differently4. The
identifying assumption is that group-level omitted variables can be captured by group-
level fixed effects (e.g. Angrist and Pischke, 2009, Chap. 5.2), in other words that trends
in unemployment incidence would have been the same for different age groups in the
absence of treatment.
Our analysis also takes into account anticipation behaviour just before the reform.
If anticipation takes place, short- and long-term effects of the reform do not have to
coincide. While the short-term effect can be directly estimated, the DiD estimator may
be a biased estimator of long-term effects: by advancing dismissals from the post-reform
period to the pre-reform period, unemployment incidence decreases—for a limited period
after the reform—more strongly than in absence of anticipation. Unfortunately, the 23
months post-reform period is not long enough to resolve this issue, which likely induces
our DiD estimator to overestimate the magnitude of the long-term effect. Furthermore,
the removal of a tax-free allowance for severance pay (see Section 3) at the beginning of
2006 may also affect our estimates.
We model the conditional probability that an employed individual becomes unem-
ployed during the period 2003 to 2007 as
Pr[yit = 1|xit] = exp[xitβ)]
1 + exp[xitβ]
, (1)
where xit represents row it of the design matrix for d (dummy coded) variables and
the constant. The matrix has k columns; β is a k vector of unknown coefficients. We
use the standard maximum likelihood estimator for logit models to estimate model
1 for four different specifications (Model O, A, B and C). The vector of explanatory
4 Another popular approach to investigate the effects of UB entitlement lengths is by means of a regres-
sion discontinuity design (RDD, e.g. Angrist and Pischke, 2009, Chap. 6). However, RDD is typically
not applied to the analysis of policy changes, but rather to estimate the effects of discontinuities
in benefit receipt by age under the same regime (e.g. Lalive, 2007, 2008). Furthermore, RDD re-
quires a measurable discontinuity, which identifies the effect of the policy change (Hahn et al., 2001).
Anticipation enlarges this discontinuity; thus reform and anticipation effects cannot be disentangled.
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Figure 4: Odds ratios of becoming unemployed from logit models compared with a ref-
erence worker aged 40 (Model O). Source: IEB, own results.
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variables xit includes information on worker’s socio-demographic characteristics and work
history, firm and region characteristics as well as a number of time dummies. Table 2
summarises the four models, which differ only in the regressor sets5. The DiD estimator
is implemented in Model B through interactions of age group variables and the post-
reform dummy, while Model C includes also interactions between age group variables
and the anticipation period.
We first estimate separate logit models for the years 2003 to 2007 (Model O) with age
40 as reference age. Figure 4 presents the resulting age effects in terms of odds ratios.
The figure suggests that there are three relevant age intervals. The first ranges from
40 to about 50, where there is no difference in the odds ratios in all years between the
age groups. From age 51 to 56, there is a monotone and parallel increase in odds ratios
for all years. The third interval includes those aged 57+, and it is characterised by
larger odds ratios for all years. While pre- and post-reform years form rather homoge-
nous groups, the year 2005 is an outlier with considerably higher odds ratios. They are
mainly driven by the anticipation effect of individuals who became unemployed between
November and December 2005 (see also Figure 3). Comparing the pre-reform years 2003
and 2004 to the post-reform years 2006 and 2007, we clearly see a downward shift in the
5 More detailed information on the regressors is given in Table 7 (Appendix B).
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Table 2: Description of models O, A, B, and C
model description
O stratified by year
A year dummies
B basic DiD estimator
C DiD estimator with anticipation
variable description in model
end of year, end of quarter calender time dummies O,A,B,C
year dummies further calender time dummies A,B,C
female, UB received, high wage, tenure >4
years, firm size >500, employed since 1993,
East Germany
covariates O,A,B,C
unskilled, university degree education dummies (reference:
skilled worker)
O,A,B,C
food, trade & services, semi-public services,
public administration
industry dummies (reference:
manufacturing)
O,A,B,C
age dummies (41, .., 64) age (reference: 40) O
age group dummies age groups (reference: 40–44) A,B,C
post-reform time dummy for post-reform
period (since February 2006),
base effect
B,C
age group / post-reform interaction dummies reform effect dummies B,C
anticipation period time dummy for anticipation
period (November 2005 until
January 2006)
C
age group / anticipation period interaction
dummies
anticipation effect dummies C
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interval 57–61 years. This provides further evidence for considerable changes in unem-
ployment incidence, because results in Figure 4 now control for different compositions
of individuals.
Based on these results and given the differences in treatment intensity for age groups
(Table 1), we choose the aged 40–44 as the reference group for the pooled regression
analysis in Models A–C. Based on Figures 3 and 4, we choose November 2005 to January
2006 as the anticipation period.
As a next step, we estimate Model A, which is a basic reference model with calender
year dummies. Table 3 suggests that older employees have a much greater risk of becom-
ing unemployed than individuals aged 40–44. Moreover, it suggests a strongly decreasing
unemployment incidence over the course of the years. In particular, there is a downward
shift after the year 2005. As this model is not able to separate business cycle effects
from effects due to changes in the institutional setup, we next estimate a model that
distinguishes between pre- and post-reform regimes for the different age groups (Model
B). The basic DiD estimates suggest that the age groups 52–54, 55–56 and 57–64 have
a lower transition rate into unemployment after the UB reform. The magnitude of the
estimated effect is greater for groups with larger treatment intensity. In particular, the
effect appears to be large for the oldest age group (although logit coefficients do not have
a direct interpretation). As the presence of anticipation behaviour may directly affect
the pre-reform period, we also estimate a model with pre-, anticipation- and post-reform
period (Model C). The DiD estimates confirm the results of the descriptive analysis
that there is a significant anticipation effect before the reform. Mainly the oldest age
groups are affected by anticipation. For the other model coefficients, we observe a high
degree of stability over the three model specifications, which is mainly attributed to the
large number of observations and the low degree of statistical association with the DiD
related variables. We have also estimated several other variants of Model C, which allow
for additional variation due to the institutional changes in 2003 (refunding of UB by
firms), 2005 (reform of UA) and end of 2007 (subsequent reform of UB), but did not
find sizable effects. In particular, the presented results are stable with respect to these
model variations.
As logit coefficients do not have a direct interpretation, it is of greater interest to
express estimation results in terms of marginal changes in unemployment incidence.
The marginal effect of a dummy variable d is defined by
me(d) = Ex
(
[Pr[yit|u(xit, d)]− [Pr[yit|l(xit, d)]
)
, (2)
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Table 3: Logit estimates of unemployment incidence
variable Model A Model B Model C
const -4.642*** -4.665*** -4.641***
female -0.218*** -0.217*** -0.218***
UB received since 1993 0.819*** 0.821*** 0.820***
high wage -0.785*** -0.785*** -0.785***
employment length >4 years -1.347*** -1.346*** -1.346***
end of quarter 0.254*** 0.265*** 0.271***
end of year 0.784*** 0.784*** 0.740***
firm size >500 -0.542*** -0.542*** -0.542***
unskilled 0.119*** 0.120*** 0.120***
university degree -0.092*** -0.093*** -0.092***
employed since 1993 0.030** 0.028** 0.029**
East Germany 0.341*** 0.342*** 0.342***
food 0.529*** 0.529*** 0.530***
trade & services 0.168*** 0.168*** 0.168***
semi-public services -0.304*** -0.303*** -0.304***
public administration -0.642*** -0.641*** -0.642***
age group 45–46 -0.011 -0.005 -0.013
age group 47–51 0.046*** 0.051*** 0.040***
age group 52–54 0.122*** 0.155*** 0.127***
age group 55–56 0.308*** 0.336*** 0.306***
age group 57–64 0.701*** 0.766*** 0.704***
2002 0.069*** 0.069*** 0.069***
2003 -0.022* -0.022* -0.022*
2004 -0.148*** -0.148*** -0.148***
2005 -0.201*** -0.202*** -0.282***
2006 -0.529*** 0.066** -0.232***
2007 -0.486*** 0.170*** -0.129***
post-reform -0.574*** -0.294***
age group 45–46 × post-reform -0.029 -0.021
age group 47–51 × post-reform -0.022 -0.011
age group 52–54 × post-reform -0.155*** -0.127***
age group 55–56 × post-reform -0.129*** -0.099***
age group 57–64 × post-reform -0.315*** -0.253***
anticipation 0.002
age group 45–46 × anticipation 0.152***
age group 47–51 × anticipation 0.183***
age group 52–54 × anticipation 0.424***
age group 55–56 × anticipation 0.429***
age group 57–64 × anticipation 0.784***
# observations 20 408 640 20 408 640 20 408 640
McFaddens pseudo-R2 0.119 0.120 0.120
# individuals 389 235 389 235 389 235
note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 4: Estimated marginal effects (me) and relative marginal effects (rme)†.
age Model B Model C
period group me rme me rme
pre-reform 45–46 -0.00002 -0.00006
47–51 0.00022*** 0.00017***
52–54 0.00072*** 0.00058***
55–56 0.00170*** 0.00152***
56–64 0.00453*** 0.00402***
anticipation basis 0.00001 0.16%
45–46 0.00071*** 16.32%
47–51 0.00087*** 19.92%
52–54 0.00227*** 52.41%
55–56 0.00231*** 53.06%
56–64 0.00505*** 117.73%
post-reform basis -0.00222*** -43.57% -0.00119*** -25.36%
45–46 -0.00013 -2.86% -0.00009 -2.13%
47–51 -0.00009 -2.15% -0.00005 -1.09%
52–54 -0.00063*** -14.31% -0.00052*** -11.85%
55–56 -0.00053*** -12.04% -0.00041*** -9.37%
56–64 -0.00120*** -26.95% -0.00099*** -22.25%
note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
† relative to an average reference worker with the same age under the pre-reform regime
where u(xit, d) = (xit,1, . . . , xit,d−1, 1, xit,d+1, . . . , xit,k), i.e. function u(xit, d) replaces the
value at position d in vector xit with one. l(·, ·) operates in the same way but puts in
a zero.6 Furthermore, the magnitude of the marginal effect depends in our framework
on the longitudinal frequency (daily, monthly, yearly etc.), and the probabilities and
marginal effects on a monthly level are rather small. For this reason, we also report rel-
ative marginal effects (rme), which is the marginal effect relative to an average reference
individual with the same age in the pre-reform period, i.e.
rme(d) =
me(d)
Ex
(
[Pr[yit|x¨it])
. (3)
x¨it is the covariates vector with zeroed reform effect dummies (interactions between age
and post-reform). The rme is more informative as it is invariant with respect to panel
frequency.
The resulting marginal effects and relative marginal effects for Models B and C are
6 Cf. Ai and Norton (2003) and e.g. Puhani (2008) for a discussion on marginal effects of interaction
terms in nonlinear models. We also computed effects according to Ai and Norton, which were similar
to the presented results.
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Table 5: DiD estimators for samples stratified by firm size and length of previous em-
ployment (Model C).
smaller firms larger firms
age shorter employment longer employment shorter employment longer employment
group me rme me rme me rme me rme
post-reform
45–46 -0.00083 -4.91% -0.00006 -2.14% 0.00121 19.54% 0.00005 -5.01%
47–51 -0.00064 -3.76% 0.00002 -0.55% 0.00041 6.52% -0.00009 -10.22%
52–54 -0.00321*** -18.92% -0.00029*** -9.99% -0.00013 -2.03% -0.00003 -3.40%
55–56 -0.00102 -6.06% -0.00022 -7.79% -0.00064 -10.16% -0.00042*** -45.02%
56–64 -0.00197*** -11.26% -0.00082*** -28.30% -0.00088 -13.98% -0.00050*** -51.55%
# observations 2 732 024 12 402 117 636 951 4 637 548
pseudo-R2 0.0578 0.051 0.0932 0.0685
# individuals 95 612 199 935 18 751 74 937
For ease of presentation we do not display the other coefficients of Model C.
reported in Table 4. As has already been mentioned, the strongest effect is observed for
the oldest age group. For this group, unemployed incidence is reduced by 0.1 percentage
points, which corresponds to a 22.25% lower incidence in the post-reform period com-
pared to the pre-reform risk. Similarly, the incidence for the age group 52–54 is reduced
by 0.05 percentage points or 11.85%, while the partial anticipation effect for the oldest
age group is 0.505 percentage points or an increase by 117%. The anticipation effect
is in the range of 50% for the aged 52–56. These numbers suggest clear evidence for a
strong anticipation of the UB reform.
Even though we have already found strong empirical support for the average reform
effect being related to the treatment intensity and for the presence of a considerable
anticipation of the reform, our second hypothesis that larger firms more likely dismiss
their oldest employees with long tenure remains to be analysed. To do so, we estimate
Model C by stratifying the estimation sample with respect to firm size and employment
length before unemployment (as a proxy for tenure). The resulting DiD estimators
are given in Table 57. It is remarkable that smaller firms (less than 500 employees)
react in relation to the treatment intensity. In contrast, larger firms merely utilised
extended benefit entitlements to generally shed employees aged 55 and older; the drop
in unemployment incidence is related to age rather than treatment intensity. As dismissal
protection makes it nearly impossible for large firms to dismiss older workers with long
tenure due to social criteria, the reform made it more expensive to buy out older workers.
Thus the result is in line with our theoretical predictions derived with the theoretical
and institutional background sketched in Sections 2 and 3.
7 The full set of estimated coefficients can be obtained by the authors on request. Estimated coefficients
of anticipation effects are not displayed, because they are very similar across regimes.
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We also analysed the role of the previous wage (as another indicator for treatment
intensity), but we found only weak evidence for stronger effects in the higher quintiles
of the earnings distributions. For this reason, we do not present these results.
6. Fiscal Benefit Analysis
Our empirical findings suggest that the financial burden for the unemployment insurance
decreased due to the UB reform, partly maybe also due to the change in taxation of
severance pay. Based on our empirical results, we now estimate per-capita-savings for
the unemployment insurance for employees aged 55 and older as well as savings for the
entire age cohort. However, the estimates rely on several assumptions: First, we assume
that older individuals fully exhaust their UB entitlements, as they are in fact early retired
and have a very low probability of re-entering employment (Arntz andWilke, 2009). This
might, however, slightly overestimate the true reform effect. Second, we are interested in
the long-run (or steady-state) fiscal benefits of the reform. We cannot, however, identify
whether anticipation of the reform led to additional dismissals or whether separations
were merely advanced. In the former case, our estimated parameters provide us with
the correct long-run effects, while we overestimate the magnitude of long-run effects in
the latter case. We can therefore only provide bounds for long-term savings.
Generally, the per capita change in UB costs for an employee aged a (expendituresa)
with maximum entitlement lengths for UB is decomposed (see also Kyyrä and Wilke,
2007) as
∆expendituresa = pa∆Ea(b+ s) + ∆paEa(b+ s) + ∆pa∆Ea(b+ s) , (4)
where pa is the probability of becoming unemployed at age a before the reform. Ea(b+s)
is the expected cost for the unemployment insurance for an unemployed at age a with
maximum entitlement length for UB before the reform. This consists of unemploy-
ment benefit transfers (b) and the foregone insurance premium (s). pa + ∆pa and
Ea(b + s) + ∆Ea(b + s) are the corresponding post-reform values. ∆expendituresa is
therefore the estimated monthly per capita change in the financial burden for the unem-
ployment insurance, where our decomposition separates the changes due to the reduction
in unemployment incidence and the reduction due to shorter UB claim periods. We es-
timate pa from the data (based on the years 2001–2005). As the level of unemployment
benefits (b), we use the age cohort average, based on wages of employees with maximum
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Table 6: Estimated monthly changes in financial burden for the unemployment insurance
(based on the post-reform coefficients from Model C)
pa Ea(b + s), in Euros
Age group 40–44 55–56 57–64 40–44 55–56 57–64
Pre-reform 0.00437702 0.00901464 0.01129875 13 624 33 956 41 675
Post-reform 0.00318492 0.00741134 0.00912115 13 624 23 508 23 442
Change -0.0011921 -0.0016033 -0.0021776 0 -10 448 -18 233
∆pa -0.0004112 -0.0009855 0 -10 448 -18 233
∆pa(anticipation) 0.0023085 0.0050465
Per capita changes (in Euros)
Age group 55–56 57–64
Due to change in expected costs. pa ·∆Ea(b + s) -73.14 -148.33
Upper bounds
Due to change in incidence. ∆pa · Ea(b + s) -13.96 -41.07
Cross effect. ∆pa ·∆Ea(b + s) 4.30 17.97
∆expendituresa -82.80 -171.44
Total cohort changes (in million Euros)
Age group 55–56 57–64
Number of employees in cohort (10/2005) 906 600 1 614 200
Due to change in expected costs -66.307 -239.442
Upper bounds
Due to change in incidence -12.658 -66.296
Cross effect 3.895 29.004
Total savings (lower bound) -66.307 -239.442
Total savings (upper bound) -75.071 -276.733
UB entitlements; furthermore, we assume a joint employer-employee unemployment in-
surance contribution rate (s) of 5%, as the mean actual contribution rate was close to
this value in the period under consideration.
Table 6 shows our resulting estimates. The upper panel of the table reports the per
capita changes in unemployment incidence, expected costs and change in the unemploy-
ment incidence. For a worker of age 55–56, the savings in expected costs amount to about
10,000 Euros, for a worker of age 57–64 to about 18,000 Euros, provided that workers
exhaust their claims. The true change in the incidence level can only be bounded as
we cannot identify whether the anticipation effect was caused by additional dismissals
or by an advance to earlier periods. The upper bound for ∆pa is the DiD estimator of
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Model C, which is likely to be greater in magnitude than it would have been in absence
of anticipation. The lower bound is 0, if the entire post-reform effect resulted from an
advancing of dismissals. Similarly, the upper bound for the per capita anticipation costs
is 3 ·∆pa(anticipation) ·Ea(b+ s) which is 235 Euros and 631 Euros for the aged 55–56 and
57–64 respectively. The upper bound of the total anticipation costs is therefore 1,232
millions Euros.
The middle panel of the table reports estimates for the decomposition (4). The major
part of the total savings results from the reduction in expected costs. Although we
provide only bounds for changes in incidence and the anticipation costs, it is evident
form the above figures that the expected savings exceed the anticipation costs after a few
months latest. Finally, the lower panel of Table 6 reports the bounds for the monthly
(steady-state) savings of the unemployment insurance, given the estimated size of the
cohort of employees aged 55–64 with maximum UB entitlement lengths in October 2005.
Our numbers suggest that the long-term burden for the unemployment insurance would
have been reduced by (66+239) ·12 = 3, 660 up to (75+277) ·12 = 4, 224 millions Euros
per year. Although the major part arises for those aged 57–64 (under the assumption
that they fully exhaust UB entitlements), the reduction in the incidence was also likely
to be of importance.
Even though the long-term savings would have been rather large, it is important to
note that the actual savings due to the change in expected costs started 18 months
after the reform (due to anticipation, there was probably even an increase in the actual
costs in 2005 and 2006). As the reform was already partly abolished after 23 months,
the actual steady state period covers at most 5 months. Nonetheless, our computations
clearly suggest that the reduction in UB entitlement lengths had important fiscal con-
sequences. The cut in the entitlement lengths likely explains—apart from improving
business conditions and the economic upswing—part of the excellent financial situation
of the unemployment insurance in 2007 and early 2008, which was generating a mas-
sive surplus during this period. Furthermore, our simple computations ignore savings
for younger age cohorts and that budgets of other social insurance branches were likely
to be positively affected, too. Of course, however, longer means tested UA claim peri-
ods after exhaustion of UB entitlements have caused an additional financial burden for
taxpayers.
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7. Conclusions
Our paper confirms that extended unemployment benefit entitlement lengths provide in-
centives for higher unemployment entries—in particular for older workers. Short benefit
durations make lay-offs more costly for firms and workers, which discourages the use of
unemployment benefits as a pathway into retirement.
It is important to identify the reasons for the low employment rates of older workers in
Germany (Arnds and Bonin, 2003). Whether it is due to the institutional design or due
to discrimination, such knowledge is essential for the design of successful future policies.
The results presented in our paper show that the 2006 reform in Germany was in fact
successful in fixing an important leak in the design of the welfare state and barring the
pathway into retirement through a period of unemployment. The weak labour market
performance of older workers in Germany had therefore been at least partly due to the
generous social security system. However, the German voting population tends to prefer
a more extensive social security system. Using 2006 survey data, Heinemann et al.
(2009) showed that only 18 percent of the German population was in favour of cutting
unemployment benefits. Thus, it is not surprising that benefit entitlement lengths were
re-extended to up to 24 months in 2008.
While we found evidence for our main hypotheses and important short-term reform
effects, there are several unresolved difficulties for a more accurate evaluation of the
long-term reform effects. Other institutional changes—regarding the pension system
and the taxation of severance pay—that have been conducted during the same period
might have contributed to the decline in unemployment entries, too. Furthermore, due
to anticipation of the reform, the DiD approach can be expected to overestimate the
magnitude of the long-term reform effect on unemployment incidence. A longer post-
reform would be required to attenuate this effect. The 2006 reform was, however, already
mainly withdrawn at the beginning of 2008. This—as well as the fact that employment
data are not available for the time period after 2007 yet—hampers also an investigation
of reform effects on unemployment durations and exits from unemployment in different
labour market states. For these reasons, an analysis of unemployment duration is left for
future research, which will at least be able to benefit from longer observed unemployment
periods after the reform.
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A. Institutional Background Supplement
Withdrawal from registered unemployment: An important peculiarity to the Ger-
man labour market were regulations for unemployment compensation claimants aged 58
or older, which made it possible to withdraw from the labour market while still receiving
unemployment compensation (§428 SGB III). These inactive unemployment claimants
were not part of registered unemployment any longer. This 58+ rule was extended to
elderly without entitlements for unemployment benefits in May 2003 (§252,8 SGB VI).
The 58+ rules were abolished at the end of 2007. Since 2008, a similar rule was enacted
for older unemployed UA recipients: They are signed-off from registered unemployment
if they have not received a job offer during one year of benefit receipt (§53a SGB II).
Replacement rates: In case of UB, the wage replacement rate amounts to 60–67% of
the previous wage, depending on whether there are dependent children in the household
or not. If the level of UB is not sufficient to meet the household’s needs and the household
have no other means of subsistence, the household is entitled to additional tax funded
unemployment compensation (social benefits until 2004 or unemployment assistance
since 2005). Thus UB regulations are practically irrelevant for households with a very low
income, even in case of positive entitlements. Furthermore, the change in the transfers
levels at expiration of UB is also determined by household wealth and other household
income. While the level of means-tested UA amounted to 53–60% of the previous wage
until 2004, it became a flat rate in 2005 that equals the level of social benefits. To sum up,
the compensation level for poor and low income households should be almost invariant
across regimes, which is not the case for wealthier households and individuals with high
pre-unemployment wages. Given that our administrative individual data provide only
partial information about the household background, it is difficult to predict the wage
replacement rate of an employed individual in case of unemployment. For this reason,
we are not able to identify the exact treatment intensity in our data.
Reforms of the pension system: Changes in the UB system since the late 1990s
were accompanied by changes in the old age pension system that made early retirement
more difficult. While the minimum retirement age has been given by 65, until 1997
in particular women and persons that have been unemployed for at least one year had
the opportunity to enter early retirement without pension reductions at age 60. This
set incentives for firms and workers to separate when workers became 57 years and 5
months, exhausting 32 months of unemployment benefits. Since 1997, old age pensions
were lowered for individuals retiring prior to the minimum age of 65 by 0.3 percentage
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points per month that retirement entry takes places prior to the age of eligibility for
the full pension. During a transition period (1997–2004), different birth cohorts could
retire with a full pension at different ages; the transition, however, was implemented
without discontinuities and over a long time horizon. Furthermore, from 2006 onwards,
the earliest entry age into pension due to unemployment has been raised from 60 to 63
years. Again, the reform was implemented without discontinuities and over a transition
period (2006–2012). To summarise, it has been possible since 2005 to build a bridge from
UB (with maximum duration) into retirement without pension reductions starting from
an age of 62 and 5 months, and with maximum pension reductions (18 percent) still from
an age of 57 years and 5 months. Since 2006, a transition into early retirement could
be achieved without pension reductions for those aged 63 years and 7 months, while
the starting age for a transition with pension reductions depends on the age cohort and
gradually increases to 61 years and 7 months (with a latter pension reduction of 7.2
percent).
Employment protection legislation and severance pay: Since 2004, employ-
ment protection legislation applies to workers employed in firms with more than 10
workers (before: more than 5 workers) and with a tenure of more than 6 months. Lay-
offs may only be justified, if the firm can state a suitable reason for termination; most
firms dismiss workers for economic reasons or offer severance payments. Firms displac-
ing workers for economic reasons have to rank workers according to the criteria age,
tenure, family responsibilities and disability. Furthermore, since 2004, the law specifies
the amount of severance payments if the firm dismisses the worker for economic reasons,
to reduce incentives of dismissed workers to file a lawsuit (the minimum compensation
amounts to one half of a monthly gross wage for each year the worker has been employed
by the firm). Generally, if older employees with long tenure quit before terms of notice
of the lay-off have expired and receive severance pay, UB claims are suspended and de-
layed by this period (§143a SGB III). Until 2004, the receipt of severance payments was
interpreted as indication of a voluntary job loss; since then it does not induce a cut-off
period if the employee has been laid off for economic reasons.
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B. Additional Tables
Table 7: Variables overview
variable description
female dummy for sex, indicating 1 for females
UB received since 1993 dummy for having received UB since 1993
high wage dummy for earning an upper-two-quintiles wage
tenure >4 years dummy for currently having a tenure of more than four years
end of quarter dummy indicating the end of a quarter
end of year dummy indicating the end of a year
firm size >500 dummy for working in a firm with more than 500 employees
(large firm)
unskilled dummy for being unskilled
university degree dummy for having any university degree
employed since 1993 dummy for being continuously employed since 1993
East Germany dummy for working in the eastern parts of Germany (for-
mer GDR)
food, trade & services, semi-
public services, public admin-
istration
dummies indicating the industry, reference is ‘manufactur-
ing’
age group 45–46, . . . , 57–64 dummies for the age groups, reference is 41–44
2002, . . . , 2007 dummies for the years, reference is 2001
post-reform dummy for the post-reform phase, i.e. since 2/2006
age group and post-reform in-
teractions
dummies for the interactions between age groups and post-
reform phase
anticipation phase dummy for the anticipation phase, i.e. 11/2005 to 1/2006
age group and anticipation in-
teractions
dummies for the interactions between age groups and antic-
ipation phase
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